Famine early warning and information systems in conflict settings: challenges for humanitarian metrics and response by Maxwell, Daniel
Famine early warning and information systems in conflict settings: 
challenges for humanitarian metrics and response
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102836/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
Maxwell, Daniel (2019) Famine early warning and information systems in conflict 
settings: challenges for humanitarian metrics and response. . Conflict Research 
Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
   
Conflict Research Programme 
Famine Early Warning and Information Systems in 
Conflict Settings: Challenges for Humanitarian 
Metrics and Response 
 
Daniel Maxwell 
 
Feinstein International Center 
Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy 
Tufts University 
 
November 2019 
Fews.net/east-africa 
2          Famine Early Warning and Information Systems in Conflict Settings  
  
3          Famine Early Warning and Information Systems in Conflict Settings  
Daniel Maxwell is the Henry J. Leir Professor in 
Food Security at the Friedman School of Nutrition, 
Science, and Policy. He directs the Food Security 
and Livelihoods in Complex Emergencies Research 
Program at the Feinstein International Center, and 
in 2016-2017, he served as the Acting Director of 
the Center. His recent research focuses on the re-
emergence of famines in the 21st century and the 
politics of analyzing and declaring famine. Dan 
also researches food security, resilience 
programming and measurement, and livelihood 
systems under stress. He teaches courses on food 
security, humanitarian action, humanitarian policy, 
and food insecurity in situations of crisis and 
chronic vulnerability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
About the Conflict Research Programme 
 
 
 
The Conflict Research Programme (CRP) is a 
three-year programme designed to address the 
drivers and dynamics of violent conflict in the 
Middle East and Africa, and to inform the 
measures being used to tackle armed conflict and 
its impacts. The programme focuses on Iraq, Syria, 
DRC, Somalia and South Sudan, as well as the 
wider Horn of Africa/Red Sea and Middle East 
regions. 
 
 
 
The Feinstein International Center is a research 
and teaching center based at the Friedman School 
of Nutrition Science and Policy at Tufts University. 
The center’s mission is to promote the use of 
evidence and learning in operational and policy 
responses to protect and strengthen the lives, 
livelihoods, and dignity of people affected by or at 
risk of humanitarian crises. 
 
 
 
The World Peace Foundation, an operating 
foundation affiliated with the Fletcher School at 
Tufts University, aims to provide intellectual 
leadership on issues of peace, justice and security. 
The foundation believes that innovative research 
and teaching are critical to the challenges of 
making peace around the world and should go 
hand-in-hand with advocacy and practical 
engagement with the toughest issues. To respond 
to organized violence today, we not only need new 
instruments and tools—we need a new vision of 
peace. Our challenge is to reinvent peace. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4          Famine Early Warning and Information Systems in Conflict Settings  
KEY MESSAGES 
• Food insecurity early warning systems are 
not very good at conflict analysis. Conflict 
data are available and could be used more 
effectively. Existing conflict data sets do 
not predict further conflict—the important 
challenge is to predict future food 
insecurity resulting from already observed 
conflict. 
• Incorporating conflict into a consensus-
based method for analyzing food 
insecurity is difficult when that analysis is 
led by a government that is a party to the 
conflict causing the food insecurity, but in 
the absence of conflict analysis, early 
warning is inadequate. This may require 
analyzing the impact of violent conflict on 
extreme food insecurity separately. 
• None of these systems capture the 
element of intentionality inherent in the 
concept of starvation crimes that would be 
liable for prosecution under international 
criminal law.  
• A major constraint on analysis is access 
to conflict-affected areas or populations. 
Access to affected areas lies with 
controlling authorities, so trade-offs must 
inevitably be made between the 
completeness of the analysis on the one 
hand and access for at least limited 
assessment on the other. 
• Predictive modeling might be able to 
address the issue of conflict and access. 
Remote sensing or crowd-sourcing 
information may also be helpful. Artificial 
Intelligence is increasingly capable of 
accessing and digesting multiple and 
disparate sources of conflict information. 
• Ultimately, however, simply establishing 
whether famine or extreme food insecurity 
has occurred is useful information, even if 
the causal links to human intentionality 
can only be weakly inferred. The 
characteristics of famine by IPC criteria 
are clear. The criteria for starvation deaths 
are less clear and need to be better 
defined.  
• Proceeding too far down this road of 
pushing for more conflict analysis or 
analysis of intentionality could be counter-
productive. It is unlikely that existing 
systems can capture this, and attempting 
to do so might further complicate the 
analysis that is currently done.  
• The discussion among technical famine 
experts about “accountability” needs to be 
merged with the legal discussion about 
prosecution for starvation crimes. The 
possibility of prosecution offers one 
solution to the dilemma of accountability, 
and improving conflict analysis is one 
critical step along this path. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Famine early warning systems began with 
support from international donors in the 
aftermath of the Sahelian famine of the 
1970s—though in some ways trace their 
origins back as far as the Indian Famine 
Codes of the nineteenth century. Attention to 
the growing number of people caught in crises 
characterized by extreme and often protracted 
levels of food insecurity, malnutrition, and 
mortality is increasing.  The information 
systems that track these conditions and 
inform humanitarian decision-making have 
expanded substantially in the past two 
decades and in many cases have reached a 
degree of unprecedented sophistication. 
Advances in remote sensing technology, cell 
phone utilization, and even artificial 
intelligence have all been incorporated into 
what used to be limited to tracking a handful 
of production, market, and rainfall indicators 
supplemented by methodologically diverse 
rapid assessments.  
These systems—and the analytical outputs 
they produce—are intended to warn national 
authorities, donors, and humanitarian 
agencies about impending food security 
crises and also to enable the impartial 
allocation of humanitarian response 
resources in crises. Systems currently are 
split between (1) those that focus on 
providing timely information to decision-
makers about the coming three to six months 
to enable timely mitigation and response 
measures (the actual early warning function) 
and (2) those that provide information about 
the severity of the crisis as it is occurring (the 
resource allocation function). Thus while only 
one function of these systems is really about 
“early warning” per se, they are often referred 
to generically as “early warning systems” 
(EWS). 
These information systems are therefore 
important for producing empirical evidence 
                                                     
1 de Waal (2019).  
2 In fact, despite the fact that the word garners so much 
attention, the term “famine” may be counter-productive 
in a discussion about “starvation crimes” because 
famine, as it is currently defined, may be too restrictive a 
that a famine is occurring, or has occurred, 
which will be important for any attempt to 
hold any parties to account for the existence 
of famine in the first place—which is critical to 
the question of “starvation crimes” as defined 
by de Waal.1 However, while these systems 
can be predictive, and are the means of 
classifying the severity of crises, they are 
weak with regard to linking specific causes to 
the occurrence of famine or crises of lesser 
severity.2 They are especially weak with regard 
to conflict analysis, or linking specific conflict 
acts to specific famine or crisis-related 
outcomes. And the analysis of the intent of 
conflict actors—which presumably would be 
critical to the prosecution of starvation 
crimes—is unheard of in either the analytical 
protocols or outputs of these systems. Causal 
analysis in EWS is slowly being improved but 
distinct risks are involved in taking on 
questions about intent. 
These systems have become increasingly 
sophisticated in the past decade, but they still 
tend to be based on several assumptions that 
are important to understand. This paper briefly 
describes existing famine or food security 
early warning systems and outlines some of 
the assumptions on which they are based—
both in theory and in practice. Then it gives 
four brief case studies of recent famine or 
“famine-like” events and pieces together the 
formal analysis process with an attempt to 
reconstruct events on the ground from a 
conflict analysis perspective—highlighting the 
extent to which the formal famine analysis did 
or did not deal with conflict analyses and the 
political kryptonite around the discussion of 
“intent.” It closes with a summary of gaps in 
the current system and an assessment of the 
risks of trying to address those gaps through 
famine EWS or alternative means. 
  
term. So the term needs to be understood broadly in this 
context, not just in the narrow technical definition. To put 
it bluntly, “starvation crimes” can occur even if there is 
no “famine” per se (by current definitions). 
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Early Warning and Information 
Systems 
Several global initiatives constitute the bulk of 
the early warning and analysis capacity 
related to famine and starvation. These can be 
grouped as famine early warning systems, and 
fragility/ atrocity early warning systems. 
Famine early warning/information systems 
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 
(IPC). IPC was invented in Somalia in the early 
2000s to provide a graphic representation of 
current-status information related to the 
severity of food insecurity—and therefore the 
allocation of international aid. Somalia was a 
context of warlord-governed territories, each 
of which were vying for humanitarian aid from 
the international community and in which 
there was effectively no central state. IPC 
developed the now ubiquitous maps that 
depict the severity of current status from 
“normal” (Phase 1), to “stressed” (Phase 2), 
“crisis” (Phase 3), “emergency” (Phase 4), and 
“famine” (Phase 5).3 IPC wasn’t necessarily 
invented as a famine tool as such, but given 
that “famine” was the most severe of the 
classification phases, its definition for that 
phase has become the de facto definition for 
famine globally, though other definitions have 
been floated by other analytical teams. IPC is 
not an early warning system per se, but its 
projections are used for EW purposes. 
In brief, IPC’s definition of famine requires the 
simultaneous breaching of three thresholds 
for the severity of current status: food 
insecurity (at least 20 percent of the 
population with no access to food), 
malnutrition (at least 30 percent of children 
under five years of age moderately or severely 
wasted—low weight for height), and mortality 
(at least 2 people per ten thousand dying per 
day from famine related causes).4 IPC 
analysis is now undertaken at least annually, 
or, more frequently, semi-annually, in some 35 
chronically food-insecure countries, and a 
nearly identical protocol known as “Cadre 
                                                     
3 IPC Partners (2018). 
4 Ibid. There is considerable controversy as to what is 
considered “famine related causes”—an important 
Harmonisé” is conducted in an additional 17 
West African countries.  
As such IPC is by far the biggest provider of 
current-status information about food security 
and related crises globally. It is officially made 
up of an autonomous group of donors, 
humanitarian agencies, and research 
institutes. It is funded and managed by the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization with a 
small Global Support Unit in Rome and teams 
in various countries attached to FAO field 
offices.  
FEWS NET. The Famine Early Warning System 
Network (FEWS NET) is a global project that 
provides early warning information about food 
security to its funder, USAID, but whose 
information is broadly available through a 
public website and a “data warehouse” 
containing valuable historic records of past 
famines and food security crises. It covers 
thirty-eight chronically food-insecure 
countries, either by actually having staffed 
field offices in-country, or through remote 
monitoring from a regional office. FEWS NET 
has adopted IPC classification for both its 
current-status updates and the projections it 
makes for early warning analysis, but it has a 
different and more detailed approach to the 
early warning function. As a result, FEWS NET 
is probably the biggest single provider of food 
security early warning information globally. 
Though FEWS NET is part of the IPC 
consortium, and works very closely with IPC 
analysis teams in the field, they maintain an 
independent analysis, which doesn’t always 
agree with IPC analyses. 
WFP/Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping 
Unit. The World Food Programme is the 
world’s largest humanitarian agency, 
responsible for—among other things—front-
line response to food security crises. Although 
it has a variety of operational modes 
depending on the country, WFP is by far the 
major humanitarian response actor in most 
crises. As such, it has enormous internal 
consideration in this discussion. This point will be 
brought up later. 
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information requirements that may not be met 
by FEWS NET or IPC (even though WFP, like 
FEWS NET, is a member of the IPC 
consortium). The Vulnerability Assessment 
and Mapping Unit both conducts current-
status assessments and serves some early 
warning functions—indeed WFP-led 
assessments are a major source of 
information for both IPC and FEWS NET 
analyses. 
Global Food Security Cluster and Global 
Nutrition Cluster. Since the humanitarian 
response mechanism was reorganized into 
sectoral “clusters” in the mid-2000s, both the 
food security and nutrition clusters have been 
major sources of famine-related information. 
National nutrition clusters—led by UNICEF—
typically organize the annual schedule of 
SMART surveys that enumerate information 
on child and maternal nutrition, health, and 
mortality (and sometimes a range of other 
outcomes). The actual surveys are usually 
carried out by NGOs, sometimes by local 
government. 
Other existing systems. Other national early 
warning and information systems exist—
usually, but not always, led by national 
governments. Additionally many non-
governmental humanitarian organizations 
operating regional or local EWS—sometimes 
intentionally community-based systems. The 
extent to which these inform national systems 
varies, and even where they exist, their 
coverage is localized and patchy. Other global 
mechanisms that track hunger—such as the 
Global Hunger Index— exist, but these tend to 
amalgamate data from disparate sources to 
make a combined index. They don’t track 
crises in real time and certainly do not do 
forecasting or early warning. 
Recent developments: Computational 
modeling and artificial intelligence systems. 
In the past two or three years, several novel 
                                                     
5 Modeling Early Risk Indicators to Anticipate 
Malnutrition. 
https://knowledgeagainsthunger.org/research/preventio
n/meriam-modelling-early-risk-indicators-to-anticipate-
malnutrition/  
6 F. Checchi, personal communication. 
attempts have been launched to completely 
change famine EWS from empirical, field-
assessment-based analyses to either 
computational or econometric modeling, 
artificial intelligence, or some combination of 
the these. The MERIAM project, led by Action 
Against Hunger, combines econometric and 
computational modeling to issue forecasts of 
the prevalence of malnutrition three to six 
months out.5 A similar initiative is underway at 
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine—forecasting both malnutrition and 
mortality rates.6 Lentz and colleagues 
developed a forecasting model for food 
security indicators.7 The World Bank FAM 
initiative (Famine Early Action Mechanism) 
attempts to harness both econometric 
modeling and artificial intelligence to forecast 
IPC phase classifications and population 
numbers within phases.8 What all these have 
in common is that they use publicly available 
data in real time to model a forecast that is 
effectively independent of both access 
problems and political interference. To date, 
all of these are prototypes, still being fine-
tuned using one or two specific countries’ 
data. None of these are up and running in 
terms of providing real-time forecasts, and 
some of them face the inevitable challenge of 
being very “data hungry” modeling approaches 
in very “data scarce” contexts. But several of 
them do incorporate conflict data, and while 
the need for on-the-ground data collection is 
unlikely to disappear in the near future, these 
methods offer a distinctly different approach 
to forecasting famine, food insecurity, 
malnutrition, and mortality. 
Fragility and atrocity early warning indices 
Fragile and failing states. Of several indices 
of fragility, the two best known include the 
Fund for Peace Fragile States Index9 and the 
OECD States of Fragility Report.10 They 
compile data on a range of indicators 
7 Lentz et al. (2019). 
8 Z. Carmichael, personal communication. 
9 https://fundforpeace.org/2019/04/10/fragile-states-
index-2019/  
10 http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-
resilience/statesoffragilityframework2018.htm  
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(economic, political, demographic, social) to 
provide an assessment of risk of crisis in the 
coming year. Using the data from the FFP/FP 
Fragile States Index (which is the most 
comprehensive), Hannes Mueller found that it 
measures past or ongoing state failure and 
does not have any independent predictive 
value11 (in other words, it reports current 
status but does not function as an EW 
system). 
Atrocity early warning and risk assessment 
lists. In the field of atrocity prevention and 
response several institutionalized efforts are 
being made to monitor countries at a global 
level12 for the likelihood that atrocities would 
occur.13 These include qualitative analysis 
frameworks, for example, as deployed by the 
UN Office on the Prevention of Genocide14 
(which is very unwieldy at present, containing 
143 underlying and proximate factors to 
assess the risk of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes); quantitative 
analysis, like the CIA-managed Political 
Instability Task Force (PITF, which employs 
political scientists in universities and which 
also maintains a separate dataset focused on 
atrocity risk assessment) and the Atrocity 
Forecasting Project (Australian National 
University);15 and mixed methodology lists, 
like The Sentinel Project16 and the Early 
Warning Project (U.S. Holocaust Memorial 
Museum).17  
Discussion of EWS 
In the context of today’s famine-risk countries, 
the existing systems described usually work 
well to highlight food security crises, both 
predictively and in real time. But they do not 
aim to predict conflict, and they are mostly not 
                                                     
11 Mueller (2018). 
12 There are also a number of regional and national 
endeavors to undertake this work, by coordinating 
across several countries and focusing on monitoring 
and coordination within countries (across government 
and with civil society actors). This summary focuses on 
global systems. 
13 Harff. (2015). The list from 2015 includes the note, 
“The hazards, or relative risks, in all countries will not 
change significantly in the near future unless any of their 
driving variables change. So these assessments can be 
very good at predicting and rationally 
analyzing the consequences of conflict. Other 
systems aren’t very good at this either: the 
genocide early warning systems generate a 
vast proportion of false positives and the 
fragile states index has been shown to have 
no predictive power at all. The tasks that food 
security early warning/information systems 
are expected to perform include assessing 
current-status conditions as well as 
forecasting food security status over the 
coming three to six months (which needs 
some analysis of causal factors). Several 
concerns arise with regard to these tasks in 
the context of conflict-driven crises: their 
organization and independence, their data and 
methods, their assumptions, issues of politics 
and access, issues surrounding atrocity and 
fragility EW, and the alignment of 
atrocity/fragility EW with food security EW. 
Organization and independence. FEWS NET is 
an independent project but is funded by 
USAID, so critics suggest it is influenced by US 
interests. WFP/VAM is deliberately built to 
serve the information needs of WFP. IPC is a 
consortium, but the practice is that in-country 
it is a government-led analysis and 
organizationally it is almost always housed 
within an FAO office, so it is often seen as 
linked to the political interests of government 
and the organizational interests of FAO. In 
many cases, all of the above works fine, but 
where the government is party to the conflict 
driving food insecurity, these systems have 
difficulty functioning independently from 
political influences. 
Data and methods. Conflict data are not 
collected by these systems. There are some 
publicly available data sets on conflict, but 
expected to be valid through, say 2020, and quite 
possibly beyond.” 
14 The UN Office on the Prevention of Genocide. 
“Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes.”  
15 
https://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/research/projects/atro
city-forecasting This is a forecasting list; it attempts to 
predict where atrocities will occur. 
16 https://thesentinelproject.org/what-we-do/early-
warning-system/ 
17 https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/ 
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these have limited predictive ability. These 
data can (and should) be used to predict the 
food security consequences of violent 
conflict. But even with publicly available data, 
analysts face serious constraints in utilizing 
these in government-led analysis processes.  
Assumptions. The timing of information 
collection and analysis is driven by 
assumptions about the causes of food 
insecurity. Almost without exception, the 
timing of analysis is driven by the assumption 
that hunger is seasonal and is driven primarily 
by environmental and economic factors—or, in 
a “dumbed-down” version of analysis, by 
rainfall and prices. In some cases, there may 
be a seasonal connection to conflict—dry 
season offensives, etc. But in many cases 
where conflict is a significant causal factor in 
food insecurity, it may be delinked from 
seasonal considerations—such that 
seasonally-based analysis may actually miss 
the greatest spikes in food insecurity. Conflict 
analysis is at best weak and generic—and 
sometimes basically excluded; analysis of 
starvation crimes is unheard of in these 
analyses.  
Politics and access. Even given efforts to 
maintain an independent analysis, information 
is often missing—making for, at best, an 
incomplete analysis. When information is 
missing because of access constraints on 
assessment teams in the field, ascertaining 
the difference between security constraints 
and political constraints might be difficult. 
Nowhere is this a bigger problem than in 
conflict-induced food security crises or 
famines. 
Atrocity and fragility EW. Most of the fragility 
and atrocity EW systems are risk 
assessments: drawing on statistical models, 
that rely on annually produced national-level 
data. They attempt to calculate the probability 
of atrocities (defined variably across 
datasets) occurring. Several verge on “early 
warning” by incorporating information about 
more fast-moving factors and potential 
                                                     
18 https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/ranking-of-all-
countries 
triggers for new episodes of mass violence—
like elections, coups, or assassinations—or 
trying to incorporate expert opinion. However, 
focused on providing a global view of risk, 
these systems remain of limited policy-
making value. For instance, at present, the US 
Holocaust Memorial Museum early warning 
project notes that it “considers countries 
ranked in the top 30 to be at high risk.”18 This 
number of countries at risk suggests that the 
rankings have some distance to go to be 
valuable for identifying when and how policy 
attention should be focused. 
Alignment of atrocity/fragility EW and food 
security EW. It is perhaps worth noting that 
the country case studies offered here 
(Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) are 
the four countries at the absolute highest level 
of fragility on the current Fund for Peace 
Fragile States Index, and three of them 
(Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen) are in the 
top four on the OECD States of Fragility Report 
for 2018. However, while this underlines the 
convergence of conflict, fragility, and food 
insecurity, it doesn’t necessarily mean much in 
terms of early warning—only an overlap in 
terms of outcomes. 
In May of 2018, at least in response to the 
“four famines” scenario experienced in 2017, 
the UN Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 2417 that highlights the link 
between armed conflict and the threat of 
famine. Much of the resolution was about 
respecting international humanitarian law 
(IHL) and refraining from attacking the 
infrastructure that supports civilian access to 
adequate food and water, but it also calls for 
unimpeded humanitarian access to conflict-
affected populations and urges prompt 
investigation into violations of IHL that may 
have resulted in human starvation. One would 
hope that this would give new impetus to 
improved conflict analysis and prediction in 
food security information and early warning 
systems. The resolution is mostly silent about 
the issue of information, except for requiring 
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the Secretary General to report annually to the 
Security Council on the implementation of the 
resolution. Article 11 however, does request 
the Secretary General to “provide information 
on the risk of famine and food insecurity in 
countries with armed conflict…”19  
 
Case Studies 
The information that the Secretary General is 
obliged to provide will have to come from the 
systems described above. However, despite 
internationally agreed priorities about the links 
between armed conflict and extreme hunger, 
the question of deliberately inflicted hunger is 
rarely if ever addressed head on by these 
systems. This is partly for reasons noted 
above—because they are either government-
owned systems (and governments are, 
without contemporary exception, parties to 
the conflicts that cause famines or extreme 
food security crises) or they are managed by 
UN agencies that have to negotiate presence 
and access to affected populations and that 
are therefore reluctant to anger parties to the 
conflict (be they government or non-state 
actors).  
This section reviews several recent cases of 
famine or near-famine crises to demonstrate 
that—despite international consensus 
statements like UNSCR 2417—even 
attempting to track and analyze conflict can 
be difficult; tracking or analyzing the use of 
hunger as a weapon of war is even more 
difficult. Several additional cases could have 
been added, but the point of each would have 
been broadly the same. The cases examined 
present the broadest summary of the 
constraints. These include Somalia 2011, in 
which a well-documented famine clearly 
occurred, but in which both 
prevention/mitigation and response were 
constrained by non-state actors and the 
counter-terrorism measures of donor 
governments; a case in South Sudan in 2017 
in which famine was not declared (though 
deemed likely) but in which government 
leadership of the process made analysis of 
                                                     
19 UN Security Council Resolution 2417, May 24, 2018, 
article 11. 
the causes virtually impossible; and a case 
from Syria which probably did not amount to a 
famine by contemporary definitions, but where 
this kind of analysis is not even undertaken by 
the major famine or food security information 
systems. 
Somalia (2011) 
Brief description. In July 2011, a famine was 
declared in areas of South Central Somalia. At 
the time, the crisis affected over three million 
people; over half a million children were 
malnourished, and though no absolute 
number was given at the time, tens of 
thousands of people were assumed to have 
already died as a result of malnutrition and the 
killer diseases that are often the biggest killers 
in a famine. Hundreds of thousands of 
additional people were displaced—both 
internally and outside the country. Although 
declared in real time, numerous critics at the 
time and since have noted that ample 
warnings of the impending disaster were 
given, but the attempts to mitigate the crisis, 
or even to respond to the acute suffering in 
real time, were under-funded and for the most 
part woefully inadequate—and in some ways 
deliberately restricted—up until the time of the 
declaration.20 
The famine declaration galvanized the 
international community to respond to the out-
of-control crisis. Overnight, donor funding for 
Somalia doubled and within months tripled. 
New and innovative forms of response—
including most notably the response to a food 
security emergency relying on cash transfers 
rather than in-kind food aid—were launched. 
Agencies scaled up, negotiations over access 
were stepped up, and a large-scale response 
throughout the second half of 2011 helped to 
bring the crisis under control.21 
The crisis was caused by a combination of 
factors. A drought of significant proportion 
swept through the whole of the Horn of Africa, 
including Kenya and Ethiopia in particular. 
This badly affected agricultural production in 
20 Maxwell and Majid (2016). 
21 Ibid. 
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the grain growing areas of Somalia and 
caused significant loss of livestock in pastoral 
areas. But equally importantly, the drought 
was so serious that low river levels brought 
irrigated farming to a halt and dramatically 
reduced the demand for rural labor at a time 
when people typically took refuge in these 
areas in search of wage labor. At the same 
time, the price of basic food grains spiked 
globally. Somalia imports most of its basic 
food grains, even in “good” years. So the 
combination of high prices for food, the loss 
of livestock, and the collapse of the rural labor 
market led to a dramatic decline in purchasing 
power for the hardest hit groups.22 
Somalia effectively had no central state 
apparatus at the time of the famine. The 
nominal Transitional Federal Government 
controlled only a tiny section of Mogadishu—
the rest of the country was ruled by armed 
groups. The famine-affected area was mostly 
controlled by Al-Shabaab, an Islamist group 
with ties to Al-Qaeda. The US and other 
Western countries had labeled Al-Shabaab as 
a terrorist group in 2008. The Africa Union, 
with strong support from Western countries, 
had troops in Somalia fighting Al-Shabaab, 
along with the very nascent armed forces of 
the Transitional Federal Government. The 
fighting displaced people, along with the 
drought and the collapse of livelihood options. 
Al-Shabaab did little to prevent the onset of 
the famine, and in fact its repressive policies 
had done much to exacerbate the problem, 
including severe limitations on access. Al-
Shabaab had made numerous threats against, 
and in some cases killed the staff of, 
humanitarian agencies  (including the World 
Food Programme) that could have mitigated 
the crisis but that had in fact pulled out of 
southern Somalia.23  
But equally important, for much of the period 
leading up to the declaration of famine, 
Western donors put severe restrictions on 
funding for anything in South Central Somalia 
for fear that such resources might end up in 
                                                     
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (2010). 
the hands of Al-Shabaab. The period leading 
up to the famine coincided with a strong 
crackdown on humanitarian aid being diverted 
and ending up in the hands of terrorist groups. 
Aid diversion was rampant in Somalia at the 
time: a UN report in 2010 suggested that up to 
half of all food aid in Somalia, for example, 
was ending up in the wrong hands (not 
necessarily Al-Shabaab—sometimes it was 
corrupt businessmen or other warlords not 
labeled “terrorists”).24 The counter-terrorism 
measures put in place by Western donors and 
agencies, combined with the general policies 
of Al-Shabaab with regard to aid led to 
extreme constraints on humanitarian action 
as the crisis spiraled out of control—indeed 
were significant causes of it spiraling out of 
control. Throughout the period leading up to 
the declaration, inadequate funding available 
for humanitarian work in South Central 
Somalia, the risk of criminal liability for 
diverted aid, and the reputational damage of 
being accused of “aiding terrorists” combined 
to preclude the kind of early intervention 
needed to avert the crisis. While the situation 
was clearly dramatically worsening on the 
ground, not enough was done to mitigate the 
crisis until it was far too late.  
This was not by any means the first time that 
the international humanitarian community had 
seen a crisis coming and failed to act in time, 
but it was probably the most tragic instance of 
this kind of “early warning/late response” 
failure.25 Eventually the death toll (politely 
referred to in the language of humanitarian 
analysis as “excess mortality”) from the 
famine would be estimated at nearly 260,000 
people—disproportionately young children.26 
Information and analysis challenges. This 
crisis was well predicted. The drought was 
caused by the well-known progression of the 
La Niña-related drought in the Horn of Africa 
and indeed, there were warnings about the 
drought from the time that an El Niño event 
was detected in the Pacific Ocean in 2010. 
The collapse in purchasing power was also 
25 Bailey (2013). 
26 Checchi and Robinson (2013). 
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noted as early as late 2010, and of course the 
conflict with Al-Shabaab was on-going—and 
had gradually been leading to tighter and 
tighter restrictions to access on the ground. 
The absence of the World Food Programme 
and other agencies that are usually the front-
line vehicles for responding to a major food 
security crisis was noted by both donors and 
the UN leadership in Somalia in 2010 as a 
major risk factor—even before the situation 
began to deteriorate. But few contingency 
plans were put in place.27 
Between mid-2010 and the declaration of 
famine in July 2011, the combined efforts of 
FEWS NET and FSNAU produced sixteen 
special bulletins or early warning flash alerts 
beyond their regular quarterly reporting. These 
alerts became more specific and more 
alarming over time.28 Additional briefings were 
given to donors and humanitarian agencies. In 
the real-time evaluation of the crisis 
undertaken in late 2011/early 2012, early 
warning information was noted as having 
been “accurate and timely” across the 
region.29 
However, what was not predicted—because it 
has never been part of any humanitarian 
information system—was the way in which Al-
Shabaab restrictions on access would 
combine with donor sanctions on aid 
diversion, to complicate and delay any action 
to mitigate or respond to the crisis. But this 
became abundantly clear as the crisis 
deepened in the first half of 2011. US 
contributions to the humanitarian effort 
declined steeply in 2010–11 (until the famine 
was declared). The Office of Foreign Asset 
Control within the Department of Commerce 
took a very hard line on Somalia, which made 
US agencies reluctant to engage there. While 
some agencies had the contacts and the 
capacity to work in in the famine-affected 
area, some refrained out of fear of the 
possible legal consequences—effectively 
basing their decisions on legal and 
reputational considerations, not humanitarian 
need. To be sure, some agencies were on the 
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28 Hillbruner and Moloney (2012). 
ground but not enough, and some individuals 
and agencies were working hard behind the 
scenes to develop an effective workaround for 
Somalia, but it was a very long process to 
work out.  
This all changed immediately after the famine 
was declared—giving the appearance that it 
was only the declaration of famine that finally 
woke the world up to what was happening in 
Somalia. This wasn’t entirely true, but the 
standoff over counter-terrorism policy was a 
major factor preventing the scale up that 
might have mitigated the worsening crisis. 
Seal and Bailey, writing in 2013, noted, 
“Inadequate funding was a direct and 
inevitable consequence of donor anti-terror 
legislation. So was the failure to provide an 
enabling legal environment for humanitarian 
agencies to operate without the threat of 
prosecution. This strategy also had serious 
consequences for the presence, operational 
capacity and access of agencies on the 
ground.”30 
Implications. No early warning or information 
system has ever been set up to predict these 
kinds of complicating factors in a famine. And 
yet it was without doubt these complicating 
factors (Al-Shabaab’s restrictions on access, 
the donors’ restrictions and the associated 
legal and reputational risks, and the absence 
of WFP) that tipped an otherwise very bad 
year in Somalia over into an actual famine. It 
should be noted that a crisis of relatively 
similar magnitude in 2016–17 was met with 
earlier and more decisive intervention. But it is 
not clear whether this meant that the “system” 
has taken the lessons of 2011 on board or 
simply that a handful of committed individuals 
saw to it that earlier actions were taken in 
2017. In any case, the threat of legal and 
reputational retribution against intervening 
agencies was much lower in 2017. 
What is clear is that it was politics—more than 
drought, prices, or even armed conflict—that 
effectively prevented early action in Somalia in 
2011. While the actions of both Al-Shabaab 
29 Darcy et al. (2012). 
30 Seal and Bailey (2013), p. 3. 
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and Western donors were not directly 
intended to cause a famine, in retrospect they 
clearly contributed significantly. And it was 
clear to many people at the time. The course 
of the conflict was not specifically tracked, but 
even if it had been, it would not have changed 
anything about either the early warning or the 
blockages to early action.  
Since 2011, most of the solutions to the 
constraints on early intervention in famine 
have been technical in nature, including 
developing “crisis modifiers” (money in 
budgets that can be called down immediately 
in the event of a worsening crisis); embedding 
“trigger indicators” in early warning 
(thresholds which, once breached would 
initiate a response “automatically) linking 
them to decision-making process to ensure 
early action and to reduce human dithering; 
and developing “no regrets” responses (early 
action ensured to be a good investment even 
if no major crisis subsequently develops). A 
current World Bank initiative is putting 
significant effort into integrating early 
warning, innovative financing arrangements, 
and better contingency plans into an 
integrated famine prevention and early action 
mechanism (called FAM).  
So the international community—now working 
together with the Federal Government of 
Somalia—has made progress on technical 
constraints. But the biggest constraints in 
2011 were political. The security and counter-
terrorism imperative clearly took precedence 
over the humanitarian imperative in Somalia in 
2011, and while the exact circumstances are 
perhaps unlikely to recur, politics and security 
concerns, together with restrictions on access 
by conflict actors, can reliably be counted on 
to trump humanitarian concerns again under 
different circumstances. So who was 
accountable for famine in Somalia? 
Unfortunately the blame can be spread to 
many parties—but no one has ever faced any 
sanction. A 2013 report by the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and 
the Norwegian Refugee Council concludes, “In 
Somalia, the restrictions placed upon 
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humanitarian actions through sanctions and 
counter-terrorism measures are considered by 
many in the humanitarian community to have 
compounded the already difficult operating 
environment in the Al-Shabaab controlled 
areas … While it is impossible to determine the 
extent to which the abrupt decrease in aid 
[observed in the 18 months running up to the 
declaration] contributed to the famine that 
followed in mid-2011, some relationship 
cannot be discounted. Certainly the severity of 
the food crisis and the publicity around it 
prompted a reversal of donor policy.”31 
South Sudan (Greater Baggari, 2016-18) 
Brief description. Between 2015 and the end 
of 2017, a series of military offensives in 
Western Bahr al Ghazal, South Sudan, led to a 
large-scale displacement of civilians who were 
subsequently trapped behind a front line and 
mostly unable to access food, markets, or 
means of livelihood and were mostly 
inaccessible to humanitarian actors. This 
gave rise to serious concerns about the 
possibility of localized famine. The civilians so 
trapped were mostly of Fertit origin. The 
history of animosity between the Dinka, who 
occupy much of Northern Bahr al Ghazal, and 
the Fertit, who occupy much of Western Bahr 
al Ghazal, goes back at least to the Sudan civil 
war when several Fertit militias, fearing that 
they would be completely dominated by the 
Dinka in an independent South Sudan, aligned 
with Khartoum. Those animosities continued 
after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
and escalated after the outbreak of civil war in 
South Sudan in December 2013. Several Fertit 
militias formally joined the SPLM-IO in 2014. 
In 2016, a military offensive in Wau town led 
to the displacement of more than 20,000 
people, mostly of Fertit origin, at the hands of 
the (mostly Dinka) SPLA. The SPLA-IO 
counter-attacked in June. Up to this point, 
Western Bahr al Ghazal had mostly been 
spared the violence that flared in Greater 
Upper Nile following the clashes in Juba that 
re-ignited the conflict in South Sudan. The IO 
attack prompted another SPLA offensive, this 
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one seemingly aimed at Fertit neighborhoods, 
driving an estimated 80,000 to 150,000 people 
out of the city and nearby rural areas. Some 
people fled to an UNMISS-controlled 
Protection of Civilians Adjacent Area (POCAA) 
site, but most fled the town and surrounding 
areas altogether to an area nominally under IO 
control to the south and west of Wau town 
known as “Greater Baggari”—named after one 
of the settlements in the area. For much of the 
remainder of 2016, people remained 
displaced, with government-IO clashes driving 
people farther into the bush. Attempts at local 
peace talks eventually broke down.32 
In early 2017, however, the fighting between 
the SPLA and IO broke out again, resulting in 
siege-like conditions in much of Greater 
Baggari. Accusations were made against the 
SPLA of not only cordoning off the area but 
also of burning crops and granaries, uprooting 
crops, chopping down fruit trees, and burning 
villages. Somewhere between 20,000 and 
40,000 displaced people, as well as the 
surviving local residents, were affected by this 
siege. The UN accused the SPLA of blocking 
humanitarian access to this population up to 
August, when some limited aid convoys were 
allowed into the area. The government 
countered that aid was freely available in 
(SPLA-controlled) Wau town and people could 
go there for assistance. But this was possible 
only at extreme risk to anyone who tried.33 
Deng et al. note that, “with reference to the 
Greater Baggari episode of 2017, the UN Panel 
of Experts found that the Government of 
South Sudan had ‘deliberately prevented food 
assistance from reaching some citizens. Such 
actions amount to using food as a weapon of 
war, with the intent to inflict suffering on 
civilians from the Government views as 
opponents to its agenda.’”34 Speaking in an 
interview in 2018, one UNMISS expert noted 
that although he was usually hesitant to use 
the term, the conflict in Wau was the clearest 
example of ethnic cleansing he had seen in 20 
years in that kind of work.35 Estimates of the 
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34 Deng et al. (2019). 
displacement ran as high as 100,000; 
numbers of people actually trapped in Greater 
Baggari vary. 
Information and analysis challenges. The 
Greater Baggari case came to the attention of 
famine analysts in South Sudan, but not until 
August 2017, after eight months of denied 
access. The famine in central Unity State 
consumed much of the attention during the 
first half of the year, when most of the actual 
offensives and forced displacement—and 
indeed the siege-like conditions and blocked 
access—were occurring in Wau County. After 
an assessment field team was finally granted 
access in August and September 2017, 
evidence began to emerge of the severity of 
the situation among the population trapped in 
Greater Baggari. An estimated 10 percent of 
the population of Greater Baggari was 
assessed to be in Phase 5 conditions—
meaning that a large proportion of the 
population was already experiencing famine 
conditions. This didn’t amount to a sufficiently 
large proportion of the population to actually 
declare a famine (which requires a minimum 
of 20 percent of the population in Phase 5), 
but the projections suggested by both the field 
team and the IPC technical working group 
(TWG) were that 20 percent would be in phase 
5 by October to December—given the 
likelihood of further fighting—and the vast 
majority of the population were projected to 
be in Phase 4 and 5 by January. This group 
estimated the population Greater Baggari at 
20,000—other estimates were nearly twice 
that high. So clearly not all the IDPs from Wau 
fled to this area, but the population was big 
enough to justify a clear statement of the risk 
of famine based on the IDP influx and the 
severely restricted access. The food security 
indicators were certainly bad enough, and the 
prevalence of acute malnutrition was 38 
percent in one area and 34 percent in 
another—well above famine thresholds. 
Current-status estimates of mortality did not 
(quite) breach the famine threshold. 36  
35 Key Informant Interview, Juba, South Sudan, 2018. 
36 This brief summary of the analysis is reconstructed 
from Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) reports, 
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Displacement patterns were analyzed—to 
explain how so many people ended up in an 
isolated (and now besieged) location. Conflict 
events were superimposed on a seasonality 
time-frame, so that both conflict and 
production cycles could be viewed at once. 
The lack of access to basic services, markets, 
and even water was described and mapped. 
But, while this included more conflict analysis 
than is often the case with IPC analyses, it 
was blended with an analysis of agricultural 
production and prices, rainfall, and other more 
standard food security early warning 
information. Given both the “population in 
Phase 5” and the projections for the 
immediate future, this situation suggested 
“elevated risk of famine.”37 While the inability 
to access markets clearly stood out in the 
justification for the “risk of famine” 
classification, it was not made clear that 
ethnic cleansing was the reason for the 
displacement in the first place or that the 
blocked access was a deliberate military 
strategy rather than an unfortunate by-product 
of conflict. 
The results of the IPC analysis for the whole 
country were forwarded to the Famine Review 
Committee. However, while clear explanations 
were given for populations in Phase 5 in Ayod, 
Kapoeta, and Nyirol Counties (elsewhere in 
South Sudan), no analysis was done on Wau 
County (within which the Greater Baggari area 
was located). When quizzed about this, the 
TWG in South Sudan noted the constraints on 
access and attempts to limit the bias of the 
assessment by only considering areas for 
which there were updated sampling frames 
from the National Bureau of Statistics—clearly 
impossible in a situation of mass 
displacement. The exclusion of known 
affected areas clearly biased the sample more 
than the lack of a statistically valid sampling 
frame for a survey would have. Long story 
made short, there were lots of technical 
reasons why a perfect analysis was difficult in 
this context, but no mention that a field team 
                                                     
narratives, reports from observers on the ground, and 
the notes of the Famine Review Committee. 
37 This was a means of signaling that while current-
status indicators didn’t all breach famine thresholds, the 
had in fact done a pretty good job of 
assessing current-status conditions.  
But discussion about whether the technical 
indicator thresholds had been breached in any 
of these four locations continued for nearly a 
month before an analysis was publicly issued. 
It said, in part, “of great concern is Greater 
Baggari, a sub-area of former Wau County, 
with an estimated population of 25,000, where 
10 percent of the population is in 
Humanitarian Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in 
September 2017 as a result of sustained 
insecurity, sporadic humanitarian access 
since 2016, lack of freedom of movement and 
extreme depletion of livelihoods. Should these 
very limited access conditions persist, the 
food security situation is expected to 
deteriorate and widen further.” The analysis 
continues to advocate for “unhindered 
provision of humanitarian assistance and 
close monitoring.” 38 
Implications. Clearly, such a statement is not 
blatantly inaccurate, but it revealed very little 
about what was actually going on. It highlights 
the current status of the affected population, 
which was close to famine, but the evidence 
to make a complete determination wasn’t 
available given constraints on access. And the 
causal analysis about “sustained insecurity” 
and “sporadic access” betrayed little notion of 
ethnic cleansing, tactical operations that 
amounted to a siege, and the deliberate 
blockage of humanitarian access that 
amounted to the use of food as a weapon. But 
clearly, if causal factors had been analyzed in 
greater detail, the advocacy call wouldn’t have 
simply been about lifting restrictions on 
humanitarian access, it would also have been 
about applying pressure to all armed actors to 
respect the laws of war, cease the use of 
sieges and food as a weapon, and limit 
military action to military targets. So why the 
watered down and depoliticized language and 
recommendations in the analysis? 
analysis team was very worried about famine conditions 
in the near future 
38 “Key IPC Findings: September 2017-March 2018.” 
Juba: South Sudan, IPC Technical Working Group, p. 1. 
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First, as well documented elsewhere, the 
analysis of famine is a highly politicized 
process in itself.39 In a consensus-driven, 
government-led analysis such as this, even a 
discussion of populations in Phase 5 was a 
near-taboo topic. International agencies 
feared reprisals, denial of work permits, and 
program stoppage if the analysis became too 
“political.”40 Several government civil servants 
had been sacked from their jobs (and feared 
for their lives for a period of time) after the 
famine was declared in central Unity State 
earlier in 2017. There was a general sense 
that discussion of population in Phase 5 was 
about as far as anyone could go unless there 
was overwhelming evidence for discussing 
famine. And as long as access was extremely 
difficult, there was rarely such evidence—even 
the declaration in central Unity earlier in the 
year was based on limited evidence. Second, 
conflict analysis was relegated to, at best, a 
secondary role in the analysis (and this is not 
an isolated case—conflict analysis is simply 
not a part of IPC or any other food security 
analysis process). Given the lack of skills and 
the political influences, there was every 
reason to keep the language in the analysis 
and recommendation very generic. 
Third, IPC analysis in South Sudan, as 
everywhere, is intended to be a national 
government-led process. Much effort by the 
IPC global team goes in to training 
government civil servants and enabling 
national information systems to be technically 
(and if possible, financially) independent of 
international donors. While that is good 
development policy, it is clearly fraught with 
possibilities for political manipulation of the 
information or analytical outputs in a context 
where conflict is the dominant factor driving 
food insecurity or famine, and the government 
leading the analysis is not only party to the 
conflict, but (in this case) the forces that were 
reportedly committing ethnic cleansing and 
blocking humanitarian access to the Fertit 
                                                     
39 Maxwell et al. (2018). 
40 One analyst who had the temerity to not only speak 
out about, but actually measure, mortality in a conflict 
zone in a different part of the country at the time was 
population that was forced out of Wau town 
and surrounding areas. 
Syria (2012-18) 
Brief description. Prior to the Arab Spring in 
2011, Syria was an extremely unlikely place to 
be talking about famine or starvation. It was a 
middle income country and, while having an 
arid climate, it was generally listed as a food 
exporting country, with a strong irrigated 
agriculture sector in its diverse economy. 
During the spring of 2011, the global price of 
basic food grains—and critically the cost of 
wheat—nearly tripled in a very short period of 
time, leading to hardship among lower-income 
people: wheat bread being the staple food of 
Syria and many other Middle Eastern 
countries. 
Syria in 2011 was governed by a dynastic 
regime of mostly minority Alawite origins, led 
by Bashar al-Assad, which took non-violent 
protests against the cost of food and 
demands for democratic reforms as an 
existential threat and responded to them in a 
very heavy-handed way. Peaceful protests 
soon turned into an outright civil war. On the 
one hand, the government and its internal and 
external allies (eventually including Russia, 
Iran, and Hezbollah) sought to preserve the 
regime and its grip on power; on the other 
hand, a loose-knit group of mostly Sunni, anti-
Assad forces came together under the banner 
of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). These initially 
formed the two main parties to the conflict, 
but it eventually involved various Salafist 
jihadist groups including the al-Nusra Front, 
the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, and 
from about 2013 onwards, Da’esh or the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The 
conflict involves multiple and shifting 
alliances, both domestically and 
internationally. Western governments initially 
supported the FSA but their focus shifted with 
the emergence of Al-Qaeda-linked groups and 
ISIL. Initially it looked as though the Assad 
attacked and badly beaten up. While no one was ever 
apprehended or prosecuted for that crime, the 
widespread suspicion was that government soldiers 
were responsible for the attack. 
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regime might be overthrown, but its chances 
of survival increased when more external—
especially Russian—support became 
available.41  
The Syrian war has been notable for the 
horrific tactics used—by the regime but by 
some of the non-state actors as well. More 
than 11 million people are estimated to have 
been displaced (more than half the 
population)—about equally split between 
refugees outside the country and internally 
displaced within. By 2019, the UN 
Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Syria 
estimated that more than 6.5 million people 
within Syria were in need of food assistance, 
and more than 11 million in need of some 
form of humanitarian assistance to survive. 
These numbers are down slightly from the 
peak of the conflict in 2016–17, but still very 
high. The HRP is notable for its careful 
elucidation of needs, but very weak on 
analysis of why those needs persist.42 
Chemical weapons have been used on several 
occasions. Of greater interest to this 
discussion however, is the use of siege 
warfare. Ruthlessly pursued by the regime and 
its allies, siege warfare quickly became the 
hallmark of the Syrian war. Homs was 
besieged from 2011 to 2014, a situation that 
ultimately ended only when opposition forces 
withdrew. Aleppo was similarly besieged 
beginning in 2013. The siege of Eastern 
Ghouta, also beginning in 2013, was probably 
the best known of the crisis—certainly one of 
the most brutal and protracted of the entire 
war.43 Eastern Ghouta was subject to repeated 
air attacks and was one of the sites where 
chemical weapons were used. In both cases, 
government forces attacked food sources and 
sought to block both market and humanitarian 
access for as long as three months at a time. 
The price of bread was more than ten times 
higher than in nearby communities not under 
siege, creating huge economic opportunities 
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42 OCHA Syria (2019). 
43 UN Human Rights Council (2018). 
44 Kanfash and al-Jasem (2019). 
45 OCHA Syria (2019). 
for merchants with the connections to cross 
the lines.44 Altogether, at least 18 separate 
siege events have been noted during the 
conflict. By late 2018, OCHA noted that more 
than a million people were still in “hard to 
reach” areas (a polite way of saying besieged 
areas).45 
Information and analysis challenges. Despite 
myriad reports referencing siege warfare with 
names like “Starvation By Siege,” and 
“Encircle, starve, surrender, evacuate,” 46 there 
has never been any formal (IPC) analysis of 
famine or starvation in Syria. FEWS NET has 
no office in nor remote monitoring of Syria. 
Only one attempt has been made—for the 
2018 HRP—to conduct an IPC-like analysis.47 
That report makes scattered references to 
impacts of sieges, but oddly does not mention 
them once as a risk factor for extreme food 
insecurity—rather using words like 
“interruption or restriction of humanitarian 
assistance.” The various governorates of Syria 
were ranked according to “severity” in the 
report, but the categories did not conform to 
standard IPC analysis. Despite being 
mentioned in the methodology section of the 
report, no information on the prevalence of 
food insecurity was included in the report, and 
no information the prevalence of child under-
nutrition, or the crude death rate. Areas are 
simply ranked in terms of “severity” of food 
insecurity. The words “famine” or “starvation” 
do not appear in the report. It proved 
impossible to collect data necessary for the 
analysis in 136 sub-districts (out of a total of 
284).48 
This is all, of course, partly due to the 
extremely limited access that humanitarian 
actors have in Syria, for either assessment or 
response—and partly due to a deep reluctance 
to endanger the little access they do have by 
crossing the regime (or some of the non-state 
conflict actors).49 The result has been an 
attempt to depict the extreme acute food 
46 Power (2016); Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (2018). 
47 Syria Food Security Cluster (2018). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Howe (2015). 
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insecurity as being caused by “instability and 
insecurity,” or even “poorly functioning 
markets,” “crop failure” other similarly bland 
terms.50 The analyses of the impact of sieges 
(conducted by other analysts, not food 
security analysts) have not considered the 
standard measures of famine analysis—also 
because of lack of access. The upshot is that 
while estimates of total mortality from the 
Syrian civil war exist, as well as reports of 
death from starvation (or from killer diseases, 
the susceptibility to which is increased by 
extreme food insecurity and acute 
malnutrition), it is impossible to state with any 
certainty what the death toll has been from 
hunger and malnutrition as a result of the 
siege. Good evidence about starvation in 
detention appears not to exist.51 
Implications. Under these circumstances, it 
isn’t clear how famine analysis would apply. 
IPC analysis can apply to any population with 
a minimum size of ten thousand people. 
Certainly at least some of the besieged areas 
had populations many times that size.52 IPC 
outcomes are based on the three indicators 
mentioned above (food insecurity, 
malnutrition, and mortality), but the lack of 
data and the inability to access the besieged 
areas has repeatedly meant that there is no 
good data on which to base any such 
judgement. And second, as also noted, IPC is 
typically a government-led consensus analysis 
involving state emergency management 
officials, UN agencies, and food/nutrition-
oriented NGOs. It will quickly become 
apparent how problematic it would be to 
undertake an analysis of the impact of siege 
warfare in Syria if the process was 
government-led (in fact, the IPC-like analysis 
was undertaken by the UN-led Food Security 
Cluster, but as noted above, it had to be very 
careful about its language). 
From an early warning perspective, there may 
be even less to say about sieges. Where 
sieges are taking place is not a secret, and the 
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consequences of being cut off from markets 
and humanitarian assistance aren’t difficult to 
figure out. The lack of early warning per se in 
a place like Homs or Eastern Ghouta was 
hardly a significant constraint to preventing 
starvation. And clearly, if and when access is 
possible, the priority is rightly on providing 
assistance, not conducting assessments. 
Perhaps more important to the prosecution of 
starvation crimes would be intensive 
assessment of, and interviews with, people 
escaping or being forced to leave besieged 
enclaves—an attempt to piece together what 
happened. This would involve activities such 
as attempting to reconstruct levels of food 
insecurity through methodologies like the 
“Area of Knowledge (AOK) approach of 
REACH, or rates of mortality through methods 
such as “capture-recapture” interviews with 
key informants, or rapid verbal autopsies of 
those who died with people who knew the 
deceased.53 
The question arising from sieges and 
starvation crimes however, is whether 
standard measures of “famine” apply at all? 
Do famine thresholds matter—or are they even 
applicable to—a context like Homs or Eastern 
Ghouta? If the starvation is a deliberate tactic 
of warfare, does it matter how many people or 
what proportion of the population was 
affected? Do the accompanying prevalences 
of food insecurity and malnutrition make any 
difference? In one of the few documented 
instances of actually being able to assess 
child malnutrition in Eastern Ghouta in 
January 2017, the prevalence of global acute 
malnutrition was 11.4 percent.54 That is not 
good, but doesn’t surpass the WHO threshold 
for a humanitarian emergency (15 percent), let 
alone the IPC threshold for famine (30 
percent). Most other SMART surveys showed 
prevalences lower than that (but most, 
obviously, were not undertaken in the 
besieged areas). 
53 Roberts et al. (2010). 
54 Kanfash and al-Jasem (2019). 
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Yemen (2015-19) 
Brief Description. Modern-day Yemen is a 
relatively new country, established in 1990 
when the south and north merged after years 
of conflict. Despite its semi-arid landscape, 
Yemen is fairly heavily populated with an 
estimated population of 28.7 million people 
(2018 figures)—mostly in the highlands area in 
the west and the north. Since 2014, Yemen 
has been in a civil war between Houthi rebels 
and the internationally recognized 
government. The political transition spawned 
by the “Arab Spring” forced longtime 
strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh out of power. 
Abdurabuh Mansur Hadi, Saleh’s deputy, took 
over but was overwhelmed by the 
combination of the Houthi rebellion in the 
north, Al-Qaeda attacks in the south, and a 
variety of other threats including some military 
officers who continued to be loyal to Saleh, as 
well as high levels of food insecurity, 
unemployment, and corruption.  
Ansar Allah (Partisans of God, known 
informally as “the Houthis”) had begun as a 
peaceful protest movement but took up arms 
after government forces killed Hussein Badr 
al-Dine al-Houthi, the leader of the movement. 
In 2014, the Houthis called for greater political 
representation—calls that were rejected by the 
government. A civil war broke out in 
September 2014 that shortly saw the Houthis 
taking control of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, and 
other areas of the densely populated northern 
highlands. Hadi went into exile in Saudi 
Arabia, though remains the nominal president. 
The Houthis took control the capital of Sana’a 
and much of the north, but their regime is not 
recognized by the international community. 
In 2015, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—but including 
a number of other Middle Eastern countries 
and with support from Western powers—
began a sustained military campaign to return 
Hadi to power and oust the Houthis, whom the 
Saudis regard as an Iranian proxy. Iran is 
suspected of providing military support to the 
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Houthis55 though whether in response to the 
Saudi offensive or as the pretext for it remains 
contentious. Since 2015, multiple UN peace 
processes have been attempted, but none 
have succeeded in ending the war—some 
local ceasefires have been negotiated. 
A year after the Saudi-led coalition (SLC) 
started its military operations, humanitarian 
agencies began warning that food security 
conditions were sharply deteriorating, with 
some analysts predicting famine. These 
prognostications were based on economic 
indicators, read against a background of 
chronic humanitarian need.56 In September 
2016, the internationally recognized Hadi 
government, either at the prompting of its Gulf 
backers or with their support, transferred the 
Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) from its 
established headquarters in Sana’a to the 
former South Yemen capital of Aden. The CBY 
stopped paying salaries for government 
workers and pensions for retirees in the 
Houthi-controlled areas and restricted credit 
to traders importing essential goods into 
those areas. Shortly thereafter, informed 
observers sounded the warnings of a severe 
humanitarian crisis and even famine, again 
based on economic projections.57 The 
significance of this is that a narrow economic 
analysis proved remarkably accurate in 
predicting the onset of a major humanitarian 
crisis, though not its geographical 
specificities. 
Some of the worst humanitarian conditions 
were reported in and around the city of Ta’izz, 
on the frontline between the Houthi army and 
the forces of the Hadi government (which 
themselves often showed fractures). The 
siege of Ta’izz saw the widespread 
obstruction of commercial and humanitarian 
food transport and attacks on agricultural 
production and food industries. The siege was 
enforced primarily by the Houthis, but the 
fractious government militia also blocked 
food, sometimes to profit from the high prices 
associated with the war economy. This 
combination of blockades or obstruction of 
57 IRIS (2017). 
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food supplies, attacks on objects and 
activities necessary for food production 
(farms, fishing boats, water supplies), and 
profiteering in the war economy was a feature 
of the Yemen crisis at every level. This raises 
the question of the use of starvation as a 
weapon of war, with some evidence that both 
the internationally recognized government and 
the SLC, as well as the Houthis, were 
potentially implicated in the employment of 
starvation of a weapon. 
In 2018, the SLC began an offensive against 
the main port city in the Houthi-controlled 
north, Hodeida. Hodeida is the critical port for 
Sana’a and the highlands—both for 
commercial and humanitarian imports—and 
fears were that if the port was closed, or fell to 
the SLC, it could push parts of Yemen into 
famine.58 However, despite a long battle, the 
SLC did not capture the port and at least some 
level of port operations were maintained. 
Mediated by the UN, a truce was signed in 
Sweden in December 2018 agreeing to a 
ceasefire in Hodeida. The peace deal survived 
into early 2019, but with deep disagreements 
over its implementation and oversight. In 
June, the UAE withdrew its troops from the 
battle for Hodeida, lifting some of the 
pressure on the port city.59  
However, shortly thereafter, the situation 
worsened with a “civil war within the civil war” 
in the south when a secessionist group took 
control of the seat of the internationally 
recognized government in Aden.60 And shortly 
after that, a missile attack hit major Saudi oil 
refineries, reducing Saudi oil production by 
some 50 percent at least temporarily. The 
Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack, 
though Western intelligence agencies doubted 
that the Houthis had the technical capability to 
launch such an attack, blaming Iran instead. 
None of this, however, helped the nascent 
peace processes.61  
At the height of the crisis in 2018, UN 
Secretary General Antonio Guterres referred to 
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Yemen as “the world’s worst man-made 
humanitarian crisis.”62 In late 2018, there was 
significant fear of widespread famine in 
Yemen: although the war in Yemen had been 
ongoing for four years, a variety of factors 
came together. All were related to the conduct 
of the conflict in one way or another—though 
not just to the actual fighting on the ground—
and included widespread internal 
displacement of people and the rapid decline 
of purchasing power by average Yemeni 
citizens. GDP had fallen by nearly 50 percent 
since 2014 with more than half the rural 
workforce unemployed or underemployed 
because of the conflict.63 Oil and natural gas 
production were operating at about 10 percent 
of pre-war capacity, severely curtailing foreign 
exchange reserves. The Yemeni riyal was 
plummeting in value against international 
currencies. Salaries of civil servants were 
suspended and mostly not being paid. SLC 
airstrikes targeted agricultural and fishing 
livelihood resources, and production in both 
sectors had declined significantly.64 There 
was an extreme liquidity crisis in the banking 
sector, limiting the ability of private traders to 
import necessary commodities, including food 
(Yemen was a net importer of basic 
foodstuffs even prior to the civil war). And of 
course the attack on the port, as well as 
lengthy inspections of ships in international 
waters and bureaucratic constraints in moving 
commodities through the port, made 
importation of food difficult and time-
consuming even if credit was available. All of 
these added up to a major threat of famine 
across the western two-thirds of the country, 
which had already been in IPC Phase 3 or 4 for 
much of the previous four years. At the end of 
2018, the UN noted 22 million people—out of a 
population of 28.7 million—who needed of 
some form of humanitarian assistance.65  
In response, the UN Humanitarian Country 
Team developed the so-called “roadmap” in 
late 2018. This was linked to the ceasefire in 
Hodeida, but also addressed the liquidity 
62 UNOCHA (2018). 
63 World Bank (2018) 
64 Mundy (2018). 
65 UNOCHA (2018).  
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crisis, advocated for means to stabilize the 
currency, and made possible the resumption 
of payment of at least some salaries. These 
actions were cited in helping to stave off the 
immediate threat of widespread famine, but 
the underlying causes all remain.66 
Information and analysis challenges. Yemen 
had a relatively limited food security and 
nutrition information system prior to the war. 
IPC analysis was begun in 2011 but was not 
conducted regularly until the outbreak of the 
war. Even since 2014, while IPC analyses have 
taken place annually, they have been irregular 
with respect to time period so do not 
represent comparable findings over time. 
Similar to IPC processes elsewhere, IPC 
information in Yemen is mostly an analysis of 
current-status outcomes (acute malnutrition, 
food insecurity, and mortality). Information is 
also collected on contributing (or causal) 
factors but is not true early warning 
information. A complicating factor is that in 
Yemen (unlike any other country) IPC analyses 
occurs in two separate but connected 
processes—one in Aden and one in Sana’a. 
FEWS NET has a presence in Yemen, but only 
informally. Despite years of attempting, FEWS 
NET has never secured legal registration. So 
while some analysis is conducted from the 
regional bureau in Beirut, its presence in 
Yemen itself is limited and informal. As a 
result, there are special challenges relate to 
both capacity and bureaucratic constraints on 
the institutional side.67 
Access poses even greater challenges. The 
IPC analysis in November/December 2018 
found some proportion of the population of 
Yemen in Phase 5 (famine conditions). Those 
facing severe acute food insecurity and in 
need of immediate food assistance numbered 
15.9 million (IPC 2018). But data collection 
teams were unable to assess conditions in the 
hardest hit areas because permission to visit 
was not granted. As a result, much of the 
analysis—particularly the acute malnutrition 
analysis—was based on very out-of-date 
information. However, unlike earlier IPC 
                                                     
66 Maxwell et al. (2019a). 
67 Ibid. 
analyses, the 2018 analysis was 
representative at the district level (previous 
analyses had only been representative at the 
governorate level). Ironically, this greater 
granularity actually made the situation appear 
to look better in late 2018 than in earlier 
periods, but in fact the numbers had never 
been higher. In the absence of humanitarian 
food assistance, IPIC estimated that 20.1 
million or 67 percent of the population would 
face severe food insecurity in the same time 
frame. This included 238,000 people projected 
to be in IPC Phase 5 or “catastrophe.”68 
However, the criteria for actually declaring 
famine were not met, and indeed some of the 
indicators (notably malnutrition and mortality) 
were well below famine thresholds. The report 
by the Feinstein International Center and 
Centre for Humanitarian Change in April of 
2019 noted a major conundrum with the data 
available for analysis at the height of the crisis 
in 2018: The “indicators of food insecurity 
(and indeed IPC classifications generally) 
have looked very severe for a long time … but 
malnutrition figures have stayed fairly low, and 
mortality figures are very low—even zero in 
some cases. It is unclear whether the issue 
here is with the quality of the data, the way in 
which data are collected, the analytical model 
on which IPC analysis is based … or if either 
the data or the process is being influenced in 
ways that confound the analysis. It is likely a 
combination of all these.”69 The report went 
on to note serious problems with the data, the 
lack of transparency and international 
checking of data, constraints on access, and 
reliance on out-of-date information. 
The IPC forecast for the ensuing period 
differed from that of the UN Country Team, 
who undertook the “roadmap” actions noted 
above. These interventions were enacted 
more or less in spite of—not because of—the 
formal famine analysis. The IPC Famine 
Review Committee (FRC) came to different 
conclusions than the in-country Technical 
Working Group regarding the projected 
analysis, and a rather substantial debate 
68 IPC (2018). 
69 Maxwell et al. (2019), p. 26. 
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ensued within the IPC team. Given the urgency 
of releasing an analysis, a decision was made 
to go ahead with the release of existing 
analysis along with a plan to conduct a new 
round of analysis in March 2019.  
However, the subsequent analysis was based 
on data collected only from 29 of the 45 
hardest-hit districts, with access denied by the 
authorities (mostly the Houthis) in the 
remaining districts. The July 2019 update 
shows modest improvements in the areas 
assessed, but of course the big question 
remains the areas that could not be assessed. 
No population in the accessible areas in 2019 
was in Phase 5. To date, there is no evidence 
that large-scale areas of famine developed, 
but certainly pockets of famine or near-famine 
conditions existed, and indeed much of the 
affected area remains inaccessible—and 
unassessed.70 
The analysis of conflict has been limited 
throughout the Yemen civil war. IPC reports 
are limited to saying things like, “Yemen’s 
conflict remains the main driver of food 
insecurity.”71 The conflict has been the most 
severe in the governorates of Sa’ada, Hajja, 
Amran, Ta’izz and the area around Sana’a,72  
which are the hardest hit areas in terms of 
food insecurity—but also the locations most 
difficult to assess. Groups completely outside 
the traditional early warning or food security 
information community have independently 
monitored the impact of the war—particularly 
the SLC airstrikes—on food production and 
livelihoods infrastructure: the bombing of 
fishing ports, attacks against agricultural 
processing facilities—and even attacks on 
fields of grain—and the destruction of water 
wells and irrigation ditches.73 The impact of 
these has been devastating, but these report 
only the incidents of attack—they cannot 
convey the actual impact of these attacks on 
peoples’ access to adequate food. The war 
has contributed to endemic corruption, 
including profiteering in food markets, as 
economic warfare has mutated into a war 
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economy. None of these conflict-related 
dynamics have been systematically 
incorporated into either reporting systems or 
the analytical frameworks used. 
Implications. While the UN-led formal system 
for food security early warning has been very 
circumspect about the use of the term 
“famine,” others seem to use the word 
frequently.74 In the end, perhaps the use of the 
word isn’t the important point. Clearly, all the 
major parties to the Yemen conflict have 
attempted to weaponize access to food, and 
whether or not this has led to famine in the 
strict, IPC definition of the word, may not be 
important. But several points are worth noting. 
First, difficulties noted in other case studies 
are worth reiterating here. If humanitarian 
access to respond to the food and nutrition 
needs of conflict-affected people is 
contingent on the decisions of both state and 
non-state authorities, humanitarian agencies 
are going to be reluctant to put even that 
limited degree of access at risk by pushing 
too hard on the authorities—particularly 
regarding the link between violent conflict and 
famine or starvation. Thus, while an analysis 
of the conflict is very helpful to the overall 
understanding of need in a complex 
humanitarian emergency like Yemen, it might 
be best if the conflict analysis was conducted 
outside of Yemen, and by non-humanitarians. 
Second, notwithstanding the fact that 
humanitarians are reluctant to push national 
authorities too far, there are international 
standards for access and information even in 
warfare, and donor governments—as well as 
humanitarians themselves—could have 
pushed harder for access, independence, and 
adherence to international standards 
regarding data transparency. This will require 
greater leadership at the highest levels of the 
humanitarian community—it cannot be left to 
the technical teams tasked with undertaking 
the analysis. 
73 Mundy (2018). 
74 GRC and WPF (2019). 
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Third, while it is relatively easy to blame 
authorities for blocking access or trying to 
control information, in this case some of the 
donors were also implicated. Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates are two of the three 
largest donors to the UN Humanitarian 
Response Plan for Yemen in 2019—as they 
were in 2018.75 These actors clearly also have 
an interest in controlling the narrative on the 
humanitarian impact of the war. 
As in other cases, the most frequently missing 
piece of information in food security analysis 
in Yemen is mortality data. The published data 
on crude mortality rates, remarkably, show a 
decline in mortality (from all causes) since the 
beginning of the war. This data is almost 
certainly, in the words of one observer, 
“rubbish.” But in the absence of information 
and data, it is difficult to make definitive 
statements about famine or even about 
starvation deaths. The available information is 
mostly about the causal factors—either the 
actual war itself76 or the economic impacts of 
the attacks on the ports and the economic 
pressures brought to bear by outside actors.77 
These document very well the harsh 
conditions under which Yemenis have been 
forced to subsist, and leave little doubt as to 
the severity of the situation on the ground. But 
they do not, unfortunately, challenge the 
“official” data about malnutrition and 
mortality.  
Other Cases 
The other contemporary case that no doubt 
bears mentioning is starvation within Boko 
Haram-controlled territory in northeastern 
Nigeria (which came to the attention of the 
world particularly in 2016 and 2017, but which 
may be continuing to the time of writing). 
Nigeria has IPC analysis and a FEWS NET 
office (Nigeria is actually in the ECOWAS 
region, so relies on Cadre Harmonisé analysis, 
but the protocol is virtually identical to IPC).  
In mid-2016, the Nigerian Federal Army 
overran parts of Boko Haram-controlled 
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territory in eastern Borno state and found the 
civilian population displaced into towns like 
Bama and Banki in very distressed conditions. 
The rapid assessment of the population found 
indications of conditions in breach of famine 
thresholds. By the time formal, Cadre 
Harmonisé-compliant assessments were 
launched however, the population had been 
served by food and nutrition programs for 
over a month, and conditions had improved. 
Cadre Harmonisé analysis accordingly found 
that no famine was occurring (some areas of 
Borno and neighboring states were classified 
in Phase 4); FEWS NET analysis focused on 
the earlier, but less IPC-compliant 
assessments, and found that the population 
had “very likely” been in famine at the time the 
Nigerian army captured the territory, and was 
likely still happening in inaccessible areas. 
This however was a controversial conclusion 
because the strategy of the Nigerian army was 
to surround Boko Haram-controlled territory 
and prevent movement in and out, particularly 
of food. Conditions inside the “inaccessible 
areas” therefore have never been assessed. In 
the meantime, the availability of food and 
other assistance in the army-controlled 
enclaves is widely thought to be functioning 
as a magnet, drawing people out of Boko-
Haram controlled areas. But the conditions 
inside the inaccessible areas and the impact 
of aid in the garrison towns are both the 
subject of speculation, not assessment.78  
Discussion  
Several key points emerge from the case 
studies. First, food insecurity early warning 
systems are not very good at conflict analysis 
or incorporation of conflict data, but there is 
no need to collect additional conflict data to 
draw necessary conclusions. Such data are 
available from multiple global sources, such 
as the Armed Conflict Location and Event 
Data Project (ACLED), the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset 
(UCDP-GED), and country-specific sources like 
the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) 
data for South Sudan, the Yemen Data Project, 
77 GRC and WPF (2019).  
78 IPC (2017). 
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and others. So the paucity of data isn’t the 
reason for the absence of conflict analysis in 
famine EWS. Existing conflict data sets are 
not necessarily predictive of further conflict—
and other forms of conflict and state crisis 
EWS haven’t necessarily proven predictive 
either. However, the point with regard to 
famine EWS is only partially about predicting 
future conflict, but also about predicting future 
deterioration of food security outcomes as the 
result of already observed conflict or its 
immediate consequences (such as 
displacement or entrapment).  
The second observation is that incorporating 
conflict analysis into a consensus-based 
analysis of food insecurity and famine is 
nearly impossible when that analysis is led by 
government in the context of a civil war in 
which the government is a party to the 
conflict. However, in the absence of conflict 
analysis, early warning is rather constrained. 
For example, in the South Sudan case, in the 
absence of conflict analysis, there was little in 
the way of early warning in 2015–16 to 
indicate that Greater Baggari was going to be 
in famine or near-famine conditions. In the 
words of one analyst, the analysis team “was 
caught completely by surprise.”79 In Yemen, 
analysts are reduced to merely mentioning 
“insecurity” as a potential driver of famine. 
This may require the analysis of the impact of 
violent conflict on extreme food insecurity or 
famine to be conducted elsewhere—or else a 
much stronger and more unified demand to 
host-country governments that conflict as a 
causal factor needs to be analyzed much 
more thoroughly in existing systems. 
Third, none of these systems capture the 
element of intentionality inherent in the 
concept of starvation crimes that would be 
liable for prosecution in international criminal 
law. If government-led systems have a 
difficult time simply acknowledging famine 
and have a more difficult time incorporating 
conflict analysis, it is not hard to see that 
government-led systems would not be able to 
assess the question of intentionality with 
regard to famine or starvation-related deaths. 
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Any assessment of that question would 
clearly need to be undertaken independently 
and outside of the context of the analysis of 
the humanitarian situation.  
The fourth observation is about ways to 
overcome the extreme constraints on access. 
The same restrictions on market access or 
humanitarian access to people cut off from 
food supplies in warfare also apply to access 
for analysis. So while it is relatively easy (and 
logical) to speculate on the conditions of 
people in besieged areas in Syria, or inside 
Boko Haram-controlled areas in Nigeria, it has 
mostly proven impossible to conduct even 
limited or rapid assessments of famine or 
starvation in those areas. So including and 
improving conflict analysis and the analysis of 
the consequences of conflict are clearly 
important to improving the analysis and 
forecasting of famine and starvation in 
circumstances where collecting information 
on the ground may be impossible. 
This could be done by building conflict 
analysis capacity in analysis teams, but as 
noted above, the constraints are mostly not 
just technical capacity, but also about political 
constraints. They could incorporate armed 
conflict in more generic way, by drawing on 
existing quantitative datasets such as those 
mentioned above, and using that information 
to predict the consequences of conflict and 
extreme access limitations on food insecurity 
(a version of this is already being done by the 
MERIAM and FAM initiatives—the difference is 
that MERIAM and FAM are being tested in 
places with at least some accessibility). Such 
approaches could incorporate measures for 
predicting mass atrocities such as the 
genocide Early Warning Project, but these are 
speculative in nature, lack the granularity or 
specificity needed to be of use in predicting 
humanitarian outcomes with the precision 
required, and may not add much to generally 
already-known information on the ground.80 
In some ways, innovative technology could be 
helpful to address this challenge: for instance, 
remote sensing to track human population 
80 https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/  
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movement and displacement, or even to count 
graves in the case of mass mortality (both are 
not only possible—actual examples exist). The 
Ushahidi platform, used to great success in 
the Haiti earthquake search and rescue 
mission, actually had its roots in the post-
election violence in Kenya in 2007–08, where 
it was useful in alerting the authorities to 
places where one local group was being 
threatened by another. Artificial Intelligence is 
increasingly capable of accessing and 
digesting multiple and disparate sources of 
conflict information and amalgamating it with 
other, more conventional forms of EW (again, 
FAM is exploring these possible applications). 
In all the cases examined here (and virtually 
all others in which there is a demonstrable link 
between violent conflict and extreme food 
insecurity—Afghanistan, Central African 
Republic, Sudan, parts of Ethiopia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Myanmar, etc.), the ability 
to access affected areas lies with controlling 
authorities—both state and non-state—who 
have every reason to deny access for either 
assessment or the prevention of starvation if 
the latter is part of—or even just a by-product 
of—their war strategy.81 So inevitable trade-
offs must be made between the completeness 
of the analysis on the one hand and access 
for at least limited assessment on the other. 
Ultimately, however, while incorporating more 
conflict analysis into more independent 
analytical process would be ideal, simply 
establishing whether a famine occurred is 
useful information, even if the causal links to 
human intentionality can only be weakly 
inferred. To prosecute starvation crimes, 
especially as a crime against humanity (which 
requires that the crime is systematic and large 
scale) demonstrating that some threshold of 
severity and magnitude have been surpassed 
would be necessary. The best such threshold 
is indisputably when an actual famine is 
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shown to have occurred. Simply establishing 
the fact of famine (i.e., the current-status 
analysis conducted by IPC) is in itself, 
important for establishing the level of gravity 
necessary to suggest that famine is a crime 
against humanity. The severity threshold for 
starvation crimes as violations of international 
humanitarian law is perhaps less high: 
starvation-related mortality at lesser levels of 
severity or magnitude than that implied by IPC 
thresholds for “famine” could still qualify as 
violations on the prohibition against using 
starvation as a method of war. This occurs 
frequently and rarely attracts much 
attention.82 
A couple of other points are worth 
considering. For instance, proceeding too far 
down this road of pushing for more conflict 
analysis or analysis of intentionality could be 
counter-productive. The one thing that current 
analysis is still partially able to do is to 
establish the fact that famine (or crisis of a 
lesser severity, but still of devastating 
dimensions in humanitarian terms) is 
occurring, which of course is itself necessary 
if prosecution is the objective. To insert the 
element of needing to demonstrate 
intentionality is likely not possible and 
attempting to do so might further complicate 
the analysis that is currently done. On the 
other hand, as this discussion should make 
clear, prosecutable “starvation crimes” that 
fall well below the threshold (in terms of either 
severity or magnitude) of the IPC famine 
classification thresholds will likely happen. 
The famine declaration under IPC is 
nevertheless important insofar as it is 
testament to the severity of a crisis. 
An additional constraint to both early warning 
and real-time analysis of famine or extreme 
food security emergencies is the requirement 
of existing systems on the rigor and reliability 
of data permitted into the analysis. While one 
5 (famine) levels or severity—or else in locations that 
never reached Phase 5 (F. Checchi, personal 
communication). If the crisis hadn’t breached famine 
thresholds, it would have gone down as just “another 
bad year in the Horn of Africa,” and doubtless, no one 
would have even thought to calculate the number of 
people killed. 
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would always hope for high quality data, one 
of the unintended consequences of a fairly 
high bar for admissible data is that while it 
tends to protect against false positives 
(finding a famine when there actually isn’t 
one) it inevitably results in very limited 
protections against false negatives (failing to 
find a famine when there actually is one). In 
the case of looking for prosecutorial 
evidence—as well as in making the case for 
rapid response—this is a problem! 
In the end, to be able to make any statement 
about “starvation deaths”—much less to be 
able to actually prosecute them—information 
would have to be available about at least four 
factors: the outcome (mortality), the causes 
(conflict or acts of war), the motives 
(intentions of the conflict actors), and some 
evidence that directly links cause and 
motivation to the outcome. That is a high bar 
to set for verifiable information in a 
conflict/complex humanitarian emergency. 
Early warning can and should warn response 
agencies to get moving to respond to a crisis, 
but it is first and foremost about prevention 
and mitigation. Even if better conflict analysis 
was incorporated into early warning, would 
action to prevent and mitigate the impact of 
conflict be possible? Clearly having 
governments as one partner engaged in the 
analysis, much less leading it, is problematic 
in a context where conflict is the main driver 
of food insecurity and the government is party 
to the conflict. In such cases (South Sudan 
and Yemen are both clearly good examples) 
there needs to be a way for making early 
warning and analysis independent of—and yet 
still permitted to operate by—governments. 
That is a tall order in today’s political 
environment. 
Famine experts have long been discussing the 
issue of accountability for famine.83 The 
discussion among technical famine experts 
needs to be merged with the legal discussion 
about prosecution for starvation crimes. That 
discussion needs to go beyond just “famine” 
                                                     
83 See Haan, Devereux and Maxwell (2012), for an 
example of how this has been attempted. 
as defined by IPC. Levels of mortality can 
actually reach higher levels in crises of lower 
severity than famine, if they are greater in 
magnitude and duration.84 
Simply making clear the political influences 
over famine and food security analysis 
highlights the problem—even if it does not 
suggest all the solutions. One clear possibility 
is that conflict analysis might need to take 
place in parallel with—rather than being 
incorporated into—the food security/nutrition 
analysis processes. While this might not 
enable changes in humanitarian access or 
response, it might help to address macro-
economic or political drivers—as indeed 
seems to have been the case in Yemen in 
2018. 
So, much remains to be done. But clearly the 
possibility of prosecution offers one solution 
to the dilemma of accountability, and 
improving conflict analysis and incorporating 
it into (or alongside of) existing EW systems is 
one critical step along this path. 
 
 
84 Maxwell et al. (2019b). 
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